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Hit Losers 
The facts do not lead to a predictable outcome because the 
implied terms of the contract do not state how to perform in a specific 
situation. One party can take advantage of the contractual silence to 
thwart the right of the counterparty to receive what is provided for 
expressly in the contract. Fact finders can review the same evidence 
and come to different legal conclusions. As a result, bringing a net 
profits case into a courtroom means the parties are entering into a 
high stakes affair where millions of dollars are on the line and an 
interpretation of the relevant legal doctrine does not lead to 
predictable outcomes. The question for both creative talent and 
studios is whether they are willing to roll the dice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current antitrust regime places a premium on interbrand 
competition.1 Interbrand competition is competition between brands,2 
such as Apple competing with Google in the smartphone market.3 
Intrabrand competition is, on the other hand, competition within a 
brand.4 For example, intrabrand competition occurs when Apple 
stores compete with each other or when Apple stores compete with 
Wal-Mart stores that sell Apple products.5 In many instances, the 
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Carlo Luis Rodes, Note, Giving Teeth to Sherman Act Enforcement in 
tthe Intrabrand Context: Weaning Courts off Their Interbrand Addiction 
Post-Sylvania, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 957, 966 (2008-2009) (arguing 
for stricter judicial scrutiny of anti-competitive behavior in the 
intrabrand context). 
Cont'l T. V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52, n.19 (1977) (addressing 
whether a television manufacturer could place territorial restrictions on 
its franchised retailers under section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
See Harry McCracken, iPhone v. Android: The Smart Phone Wars Rage 
On, TIME (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/ 
0,8599,2023452,00.html (noting "the battle between the iPhone and 
Android is in its early stages"). 
Cont'l T. V., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 ("Intrabrand competition is the 
competition between the distributors - wholesale or retail - of the 
product of a particular manufacturer."). 
The key to determining intrabrand competition is correctly defining the 
product or service the party provides. For instance, an Apple Store that 
sells iPhones and a nearby cellular service provider that sells iPhones is 
intrabrand competition. The same label, i.e., Apple, is being sold at 
different distributors. At the interbrand level, however, Apple and 
Google compete in the smart phone market. The cellular service 
provider is a retailer of a service. So it competes interbrand against 
other cellular service providers. 
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introduction of vertical restraints enhances interbrand competition at 
the expense of diminishing intrabrand competition.6 
Generally, a manufacturer imposing vertical price restraints upon 
its distributors will create efficiencies. 7 Instead of competing on price, 
the distributors compete by investing in and providing superior 
customer service and other non-price factors. 8 One form of vertical 
restriction is using exclusive territorial restraints, whereby an 
upstream manufacturer will "assign distributors to a particular 
geographical area or sales territory with the objective of restricting 
intrabrand competition. "9 These agreements prohibit distributors of 
the same brand from operating in one another's territory. 10 For 
example, Apple may forbid its product retailers from operating within 
a certain proximity of another retailer selling Apple products or one of 
Apple's stores. 
6. Cont'l T. V., 433 U.S. at 54-55 (finding "vertical restrictions reduce 
intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular 
product competing for the business of a given group of buyers," and 
"vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the 
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his 
products"). 
7. Id. ("Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing 
the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his 
products . . . for example, new manufacturers and manufacturers 
entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce 
competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of . 
capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products 
unknown to the consumer. Established manufacturers can use them to 
induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service 
and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their 
products. Service and repair are vital for many products, such as 
automobiles and major household appliances. The availability and 
quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the 
competitiveness of his product."). 
8. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 
(2006) ("A single manufacturer's use of vertical price restraints tends to 
eliminate intrabrand price competition; this in turn encourages retailers 
to invest in tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that 
aid the manufacturer's position as against rival manufacturers."). 
9. Shantau Dutta et al., Vertical Territorial Restrictions And Public 
Policy: Theories And Industry Evidence, 63 J. MKTG .. 121, 121 (1999), 
available at http://research3.bus.wisc.edu/file.php/153/ 
Vertical_ Territorial.:._ Restrictions. pdf. 
10. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs. , Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 
1569 (11th Cir. 1983) (describing a distribution system with vertical 
non-price exclusive territorial restraints). 
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Product turnover is significantly greater in high technology 
markets than other markets.11 As technology increases in complexity, 
consumers will likely require more guidance from vendors of high 
technology products than from vendors of other types of products. 
Superior customer service is integral to providing sufficient 
information to customers purchasing or dealing with technology.12 
However, by geographically diminishing competition, vertical 
territorial restraints weaken the incentive to compete in providing 
superior customer service. 13 While interbrand competition appears 
more important than intrabrand competition when considering 
vertical restraints, that determination depends on the circumstances 
and the market characteristics.14 
The exceptional nature of high technology markets assures -
particularly in the cases of larger retailors or big-box stores - that 
decreasing or eliminating intrabrand competition will adversely affect 
consumers in certain geographic markets. 15 The current school of 
11. See Prepared Remarks, F.T.C. Chairman Robert Pitofsky, Pitofsky 
Statement on Antitrust Analysis in High-Tech Industries (Feb. 25, 
1999) [hereinafter Pitosfsky Statement], http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ 
pitofsky/hitch.shtm ("New generations of products, undermining 
existing market power, appear more frequently in high-tech than in 
mature industries."). 
12. Michael Lowenstein, High-Tech Customer Service in the Spotlight, 
CUSTOMERTHINK (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.customerthink.com/ 
article/high_tech_customer_service_in_the_spotlight ("Over 80 
percent of customers agree that superior customer support increases 
their likelihood of making subsequent purchases from the same 
supplier."). 
13. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., 717 F.2d at 1571 ("A vertical restraint on 
trade, almost by definition, involves some reduction in intrabrand 
competition. . . .a restriction of intrabrand competition may-depending 
on the interbrand market structure-either enhance or diminish overall 
competition, and hence consumer welfare."). The Internet arguably 
extends to all geographic markets; however, this subject exceeds this 
Comment's scope. 
14. See Warren S. Grimes, The Life Cycle of A Venerable Precedent: GTE 
Sylvania and The Future of Vertical Restraints Law, 17 ANTITRUST 27, 
27-28 (2002-2003) ("[W]hether interbrand competition is more important 
than intrabrand competition must depend on the context. Without 
vigorous intrabrand competition, efficiency in the all important retail 
sector would suffer and consumers would pay more."). 
15. See id. at 96 ("[I]ntrabrand competition is particularly important at the 
retail level, where the risk is highest that a vertical restraint will foster 
brand differentiation through exploitation of consm;ner information 
gaps."); see also Rodes, supra note 1, at 962 ("Within many intrabrand 
markets, anticompetitive and monopolistic conduct is a real threat, if 
not already a reality, and deserves more attention from the courts than 
it currently receives."); Grimes, supra note 14, at 27-28 ("Without 
vigorous intrabrand competition, efficiency in the all important retail 
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1569 (11th Cir. 1983) (describing a distribution system with vertical 
non-price exclusive territorial restraints). 
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thought identifies consumer welfare as the exclusive goal of antitrust 
laws. 16 As Justice Brandeis suggested in Board of Trade of City of 
Chicago v. United States, courts should analyze the effects of vertical 
territorial restraints in high technology markets by considering the 
characteristics peculiar to the situation.17 This Comment recommends 
courts adopt a three-prong test that clarifies the overall effects of a 
vertical territorial restraint in a high technology market and whether 
consumers are being harmed by the particular arrangement. 
Section II explores the current antitrust framework, including an 
overview of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the rule of 
reason, vertical and horizontal restraints, and court's current method 
of evaluating vertical restraints. Section III discusses the distinct 
nature of high technology markets, the importance of customer service 
to consumers of high technology products, and the hazard large, 
independent retailors without sufficient intrabrand competition pose 
to consumers. Lastly, Section IV proposes a three-pronged test courts 
should apply when analyzing vertical territorial restraints in high 
technology markets. 
II. THE CURRENT ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK: SECTION 1 OF 
THE SHERMAN ACT, THE RULE OF REASON, AND THE 
CURRENT TREATMENT OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
This section provides some necessary background on the structure 
of current antitrust law and how courts apply that law to analyze the 
validity of vertical restraints. Section A will introduce section 1 of the 
sector would suffer and consumers would pay more."); Written 
Materials, F.T.C. Comm'r Pamela Jones Harbour, Harbour Speech on 
Vertical Restraints: Federal and State Enforcement of Vertical Issues, at 
4-5 (Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/ 
050329vertical.pdf ("Consumers understand that they benefit from 
competition among manufacturers. Consumers also understand that 
they benefit from competition among retailers. Consumers want - and 
are entitled to receive - the pricing alternatives that retail competition 
can deliver, rather than just the manufacturer's 'suggested retail price.' 
Consumers deserve the results of competitive markets; they should not 
be left to the mercies of a manufacturer's prescience or the misplaced 
incentives of retailers. Simply stated, consumers want to buy the most 
desirable products at the lowest prices."). 
16. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and The Policy of The Sherman Act, 
9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 (1966) (discussing courts' need to "distinguish 
between agreements or activities that increase wealth through efficiency 
and those that decrease it through restriction of output."). 
17. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
( 1918) (noting the test for legality turns on "the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after 
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable."). 
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Sherman Antitrust Act. Section B identifies the "rule of reason" as 
the predominant analytical framework for assessing vertical restraints 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Finally, Section C presents the 
rule of reason toward vertical restraints established by the seminal 
Supreme Court case, Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania. 
A. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
Courts apply the rule of reason when analyzing vertical restraints 
of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 18 This section 
states: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. 
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony . . . .19 
Legal scholars do not entirely agree on Congress's intent behind 
the Sherman Act.20 The Sherman Act was promulgated during a time 
when the public feared large institutions.21 The "Harvard School" 
approach incorporates a fear of large institutions and the acquisition 
of substantial market share and concentration.22 By contrast, the 
"Chicago School" posits that Congress viewed consumer welfare as the 
18. See Rodes, supra note 1, at 962 (noting that courts apply the rule of 
reason by examining "the particularities of the relevant business under 
consideration and the restraint's history, nature, and effect."). 
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004) (describing a fine and prison term for violation of 
the provision). 
20. William L. Letwin,. Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-
1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 221 (1955-1956) ("The deceptive 
simplicity of the Sherman Act has led many historians to believe that 
the intention of Congress was equally simple. Although they have not 
agreed on what the intention was, these historians have shared the view 
that the motives of Congress was elementary and unmixed and have 
differed chiefly over whether Congress was sincere."). 
21. Id. at 222 ("No one denies that Congress passed the Sherman Act in 
response to real public feeling against the trusts."). 
22. Thomas A. Piraino, Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A 
New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 346 
(2007) ("In the 1960s and 1970s, the courts and agencies adopted the 
economic theories of a group of Harvard scholars who assumed that 
firms with market power would act in an anticompetitive manner. 
Under the 'Harvard School' approach, the courts and agencies presumed 
the illegality of any mergers, joint ventures, or agreements that allowed 
firms to obtain, enhance, or exercise market power, regardless of 
whether the conduct had the potential to benefit consumers by lowering 
prices or increasing output."). 
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fundamental policy concern behind the Sherman Act.23 Since the 
1970s, courts began adopting the "Chicago School" approach, with an 
eye toward promoting and protecting consumer welfare while allowing 
greater leeway in permitting firms to expand. 24 
B. The Rule of Reason: The Framework for Analyzing Vertical 
Restraints under Section 1 of The Sherman Antitrust Act 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States established the 
rule of reason. 25 Although the Standard Oil Court did not provide 
substantive guidance on the rule of reason, later courts have 
developed an interpretive framework. 26 An analysis under the rule of 
reason begins with the question of whether an agreement exists 
between two or more natural or legal persons under section 1 of the 
23. See Bork, supra note 16 ("Congress intended courts to implement only 
the value we would today call consumer welfare. To put it another way, 
the policy the courts were intended to apply is the maximization of 
wealth or consumer want satisfaction."); see also Piraino, supra note 22 
(" [B]eginning in the late 1970s, the courts and agencies began to adopt 
the theories of a group of University of Chicago academics, who taught 
that the only legitimate goal of the antitrust laws was to promote 
consumer welfare. Under the 'Chicago School' approach, the courts and 
agencies became much less willing to prohibit competitive conduct on its 
face. Instead, they felt compelled to engage in an extensive factual 
inquiry to confirm the effects of particular conduct on consumers before 
finding it illegal."). 
24. Piraino, supra note 22, at 351 (noting the "Chicago" approach "led 
courts and agencies to become more lenient in allowing firms to acquire 
and exercise market power."). In addition, a post-"Chicago School" 
approach is developing. See Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, 
and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1924 (2009) ("So Chicago is 
unempirical. What does post-Chicago offer to take its place? The answer 
is: not much so far."). 
25. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) ("If the 
criterion by which it is to be determined in all cases whether every 
contract, combination, etc., is a restraint of trade within the intendment 
of the law, is the direct or indirect effect of the acts involved, then of 
course the rule of reason becomes the guide, and the construction which 
we have given the statute, instead of being refuted by the cases relied 
upon, is by those cases demonstrated to be correct. This is true, because 
the construction which we have deduced from the history of the act and 
the analysis of its text is simply that in every case where it is claimed 
that an act or acts are in violation of the statute, the rule of reason, in 
the light of the principles of law and the public policy which the act 
embodies, must be applied."); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule 
of Reason Re-Examined, 67 Bus. LAW. 435, 440 (2012) ("[S]tandard Oil 
established the Rule of Reason as the governing standard for adjudging 
liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act .... "). 
26. Id. at 440-44 (illustrating the evolution of the rule of reason). 
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Sherman Act.27 Next, the court will determine if the defendant had 
market power in the relevant market. 28 In most cases, this analysis 
involves defining the relevant product and geographic markets and 
calculating a firm's market share.29 Last, the court will determine 
whether the course of conduct at issue adversely affected consumers in 
the relevant market.30 
A firm's conduct is essential to determining what factors or 
variation of the rule of reason a court will apply.31 A court may rely 
27. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004) (requiring an agreement of some sort to establish 
liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). There is no set t"Jst for 
the rule of reason; courts generally disagree on rule of reason analysis. 
The "general framework" is supposed to illustrate the most commonly 
utilized factors that courts apply in Section 1 cases. Three Movies of 
Tarz~na v. Pac. Theatres, 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987) ("To 
establish a cause of action for an unreasonable restraint of trade under 
the rule of reason, the plaintiff must show: '(1) An agreement among 
two or more persons or distinct business entities; (2) which is intended 
to harm or unreasonably restrain competition; and (3) which actually 
causes injury to competition."'). 
28. See Jared Kagan, Note, Bricks, Mortar, and. Google: Defining the 
Relevant Antitrust Market for Internet-Based Companies, 55 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 271, 279 (2010-2011) ("When examining a market in an 
antitrust case, courts must define the relevant geographic market. . . In 
addition to defining the geographic market in an antitrust case, it is 
necessary to define the relevant product market to determine 'which 
products compete with the defendant's product and thus limit or 
prevent the exercise of market power."'); see also Matt Koehler, Note, 
The Importance of Correctly Identifying the Consumer for An Antitrust 
Relevant Market Analysis, 67 UMKC L. REV. 521, 521 (1998-1999) 
("Claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust 
Act often require proof of the defendant's market power by the plaintiff. 
In order to prove that a defendant possesses market power, a plaintiff 
must establish the relevant market which enables the court to decide if 
market power exists."). 
29. See Kagan, supra note 28 (noting the relevant geographic and product 
market analyses are distinct); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (noting the relevant product is "determined by 
the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand 
between the product itself and substitutes for it."); Tampa Elec. Co. v. 
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (defining the relevant 
geographic market as "the market area in which the seller operates, and 
to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies"). 
30. Tampa Blee., 365 U.S. at 334 (1961) (determining that a long-term 
contract ensuring fuel supply to the general public outweighed the anti-
competitive effects of that contract). 
31. See, e.g., id. at 320 (finding the exclusive dealing contracts did not tie 
up a sufficient percentage of the market and applying the exclusive 
dealing variation of the rule of reason); Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago 
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (finding nearly all trade 
organizations utilize restraints that restrict its members' conduct and 
generally applied the quick look analysis); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 
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fundamental policy concern behind the Sherman Act. 23 Since the 
1970s, courts began adopting the "Chicago School" approach, with an 
eye toward promoting and protecting consumer welfare while allowing 
greater leeway in permitting firms to expand.24 
B. The Rule of Reason: The Framework for Analyzing Vertical 
Restraints under Section 1 of The Sherman Antitrust Act 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States established the 
rule of reason.25 Although the Standard Oil Court did not provide 
substantive guidance on the rule of reason, later courts have 
developed an interpretive framework. 26 An analysis under the rule of 
reason begins with the question of whether an agreement exists 
between two or more natural or legal persons under section 1 of the 
23. See Bork, supra note 16 ("Congress intended courts to implement only 
the value we would today call consumer welfare. To put it another way, 
the policy the courts were intended to apply is the maximization of 
wealth or consumer want satisfaction."); see also Piraino, supra note 22 
("[B]eginning in the late 1970s, the courts and agencies began to adopt 
the theories of a group of University of Chicago academics, who taught 
that the only legitimate goal of the antitrust laws was to promote 
consumer welfare. Under the 'Chicago School' approach, the courts and 
agencies became much less willing to prohibit competitive conduct on its 
face. Instead, they felt compelled to engage in an extensive factual 
inquiry to confirm the effects of particular conduct on consumers before 
finding it illegal."). 
24. Piraino, supra note 22, at 351 (noting the "Chicago" approach "led 
courts and agencies to become more lenient in allowing firms to acquire 
and exercise market power."). In addition, a post-"Chicago School" 
approach is developing. See Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, 
and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1924 (2009) ("So Chicago is 
unempirical. What does post-Chicago offer to take its place? The answer 
is: not much so far."). 
25. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) ("If the 
criterion by which it is to be determined in all cases whether every 
contract, combination, etc., is a restraint of trade within the intendment 
of the law, is the direct or indirect effect of the acts involved, then of 
course the rule of reason becomes the guide, and the construction which 
we have given the statute, instead of· being refuted by the cases relied 
upon, is by those cases demonstrated to be correct. This is true, because 
the construction which we have deduced from the history of the act ahd 
the analysis of its text is simply that in every case where it is claimed 
that an act or acts are in violation of the statute, the rule of reason, in 
the light of the principles of law and the public policy which the act 
embodies, must be applied."); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule 
of Reason Re-Examined, 67 Bus. LAW. 435, 440 (2012) ("[S]tandard Oil 
established the Rule of Reason as the governing standard for adjudging 
liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act .... "). 
26. Id. at 440-44 (illustrating the evolution of the rule of reason). 
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Sherman Act.27 Next, the court will determine if the defendant had 
market power in the relevant market.28 In most cases, this analysis 
involves defining the relevant product and geographic markets and 
calculating a firm's market share.29 Last, the court will determine 
whether the course of conduct at issue adversely affected consumers in 
the relevant market.30 
A firm's conduct is essential to determining what factors or 
variation of the rule of reason a court will apply.31 A court may rely 
27. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2004) (requiring an agreement of some sort to establish 
liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). There is no set test for 
the rule of reason; courts generally disagree on rule of reason analysis. 
The "general framework" is supposed to illustrate the most commonly 
utilized factors that courts apply in Section 1 cases. Three Movies of 
Tarz~na v. Pac. Theatres, 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987) ("To 
establish a cause of action for an unreasonable restraint of trade under 
the rule of reason, the plaintiff must show: '(1) An agreement among 
two or more persons or distinct business entities; (2) which is intended 
to harm or unreasonably restrain competition; and (3) which actually 
causes injury to competition."'). 
28. See Jared Kagan, Note, Bricks, Mortar, and. Google: Defining the 
Relevant Antitrust Market for Internet-Based Companies, 55 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 271, 279 (2010-2011) ("When examining a market in an 
antitrust case, courts must define the relevant geographic market ... In 
addition to defining the geographic market in an antitrust case, it is 
necessary to define the relevant product market to determine 'which 
products compete with the defendant's product and thus limit or 
prevent the exercise of market power."'); see also Matt Koehler, Note, 
The Importance of Correctly Identifying the Consumer for An Antitrust 
Relevant Market Analysis, 67 UMKC L. REV. 521, 521 (1998-1999) 
("Claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust 
Act often require proof of the defendant's market power by the plaintiff. 
In order to prove that a defendant possesses market power, a plaintiff 
must establish the relevant market which enables the court to decide if 
market power exists."). 
29. See Kagan, supra note 28 (noting the relevant geographic and product 
market analyses are distinct); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (noting the relevant product is "determined by 
the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand 
between the product itself and substitutes for it."); Tampa Elec. Co. v. 
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (defining the relevant 
geographic market as "the market area in which the seller operates, and 
to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies"). 
30. Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 334 (1961) (determining that a long-term 
contract ensuring fuel supply to the general public outweighed the anti-
competitive effects of that contract). 
31. See, e.g., id. at 320 (finding the exclusive dealing contracts did not tie 
up a sufficient percentage of the market and applying the exclusive 
dealing variation of the rule of reason); Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago 
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (finding nearly all trade 
organizations utilize restraints that restrict its members' conduct and 
generally applied the quick look analysis); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 
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on an abbreviated version of the rule of reason, termed the "quick 
look, "32 when a firm has induced distributors to discriminate or when 
a considerable market inquiry is unnecessary because the suspect 
restraint is not so anticompetitive as to warrant per se treatment.33 
C. Vertical Restraints and Substantial Market Share: The Rule of 
Reason Analysis Set Forth by GTE Sylvania and Subsequent Cases 
Antitrust law distinguishes between horizontal and vertical° 
restraints. 34 Horizontal restraints occur between competitors at the 
same level of the distribution chain.35 The vast majority of cases find 
horizontal agreements between competitors per se invalid due to their 
anticompetitive nature.36 By contrast, vertical restraints are formed 
between different levels of the distribution chain. 37 For example, a 
vertical restraint imposed by Apple might require all Apple retailers 
to sell iPads at the same price. 
221 F.3d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding Toys "R" Us facilitated a 
naked horizontal agreement at the retailer level and applying the quick 
look analysis); Cal. Dental Ass'n, v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (9th Cir. 
1999) (finding that a more intensive inquiry than the quick look was 
necessary since courts did not have substantial experience with 
analyzing dentists, and thereby remanded the case to apply the full rule 
of reason). 
32. Cavangh, supra note 25, at 458; see also Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n 
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (illustrating the 
quick look variation of the rule of reason being applied in a case). 
33. Cavangh, supra note 25, at 458; see also Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 
468 U.S. at 109 (applying "quick look" or "truncated" rule of reason 
analysis, holding elaborate inquiry was unnecessary to ascertain 
competitive merit of restraints). 
34. Mark A. Lemley, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1219 (2008) ("Antitrust law draws a fundamental 
distinction between so-called horizontal and vertical agreements."). 
35. Id. ("Horizontal agreements are contracts or conspiracies among 
competitors--firms at the same level in the distribution chain that we 
would expect to compete against each other in a free market."). 
36. Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 59 n.28 (1977) ("There may 
be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from 
horizontal restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers. 
There is no doubt that restrictions in the latter category would be illegal 
per se. "); see also Lemley, supra note 34, at 1219 ("Horizontal 
agreements are much more likely to be condemned as per se illegal, 
while analogous vertical restraints are evaluated under the rule of 
reason."); Jeffrey M. Knetsch, A Uniform Rule of Reason for Vertical 
and Horizontal Nonprice Restraints, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 448 (1982) 
(" [H]orizontal arrangements are- inherently more suspect [than vertical 
agreements]."). 
37. Knetsch, supra note 36, at 444 ("Vertical restraints are restrictions 
imposed upon the transfer of goods~ from one level of the production 
chain to another."). 
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Courts differentiate two types of vertical restraints price and 
non-price. 38 Vertical price restraints require distributors to sell certain 
products at a specified price or to establish minimum or maximum 
prices.39 These restraints can promote interbrand competition because 
they induce retailers to invest in intangibles such as exemplary 
customer service.40 The other form of vertical restraint, non-price,41 to 
commonly take the form of exclusive territorial restraints on 
distributors by manufacturers.42 Exclusive territorial restraints permit 
distributors to exercise exclusive control over a geographic locale.43 
Courts analyze price and non-price vertical restraints under the 
rule of reason,44 centrally considering whether the manufacturer has 
38. See Joseph Anthony Capezzuto, The Nonprice is Right: the Price 
Cutter's Bane Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, 24 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 565, 566 (1989) ("In determining which rule applies, the Court 
has distinguished between vertical price restraints and vertical nonprice 
restraints."). 
39. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (illustrating the 
imposition of vertical maximum price restraints). 
40. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007) 
("A single manufacturer's use of vertical price restraints tends to 
eliminate intrabrand price competition; this in turn encourages retailers 
to invest in tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that 
aid the manufacturer's position as against rival manufacturers. Resale 
price maintenance also has the potential to give consumers more options 
so that they can choose among low-price, low-service brands; high-price, 
high-service brands; and brands that fall in between."). 
41. See generally Knetsch, supra note 36, at 444-46 (explaining the 
differences between vertical price and nonprice restraints and the 
resulting competitive effects of vertical and horizontal restraints). 
42. Id. at 444-45 ("The most common nonprice restraints are geographic 
market divisions"); see also Carole A. Casey, The Rule of Reason 
Analysis of Dual Distribution Systems: Does It Further the Purposes of 
the Sherman Act?, 29 B.C. L. REV. 431, 435 (1988) ("Agreements among 
competitors to allocate exclusive territories are a common business 
practice frequently challenged under the Sherman Act."). 
43. See Shantau Dutta et. al., Vertical Territorial Restrictions and Public 
Policy: Theories and Industry Evidence, 63 J. OF MKTG. 121 (1999), 
available at http://research3.bus.wisc.edu/file.php/153/ 
Vertical_Territorial_Restrictions.pdf ("Such restrictions, which are 
initiated by a manufacturer, assign distributors to a particular 
geographical area or sales territory with the objective of restricting 
intrabrand competition."). 
44. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890 (holding that the full rule of reason analysis 
applies to all vertical price restraints); see also Graphic Prods. Distribs. 
v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Where the 
manufacturer retains ownership and the risk of loss, the more flexible 
rule of reason would apply,"); see also Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 
U.S. 36, 59 (1977) ("[W]e conclude that the appropriate decision is to 
return to the rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions."). 
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on an abbreviated version of the rule of reason, termed the "quick 
look, "32 when a firm has induced distributors to discriminate or when 
a considerable market inquiry is unnecessary because the suspect 
restraint is not so anticompetitive as to warrant per se treatment.33 
C. Vertical Restraints and Substantial Market Share: The Rule of 
Reason Analysis Set Forth by GTE Sylvania and Subsequent Cases 
Antitrust law distinguishes between horizontal and vertical 
restraints. 34 Horizontal restraints occur between competitors at the 
same level of the distribution chain. 35 The vast majority of cases find 
horizontal agreements between competitors per se invalid due to their 
anticompetitive nature.36 By contrast, vertical restraints are formed 
between different levels of the distribution chain.37 For example, a 
vertical restraint imposed by Apple might require all Apple retailers 
to sell iPads at the same price. 
221 F.3d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding Toys "R" Us facilitated a 
naked horizontal agreement at the retailer level and applying the quick 
look analysis); Cal. Dental Ass'n, v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (9th Cir. 
1999) (finding that a more intensive inquiry than the quick look was 
necessary since courts did not have substantial experience with 
analyzing dentists, and thereby remanded the case to apply the full rule 
of reason). 
32. Cavangh, supra note 25, at 458; see also Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n 
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (illustrating the 
quick look variation of the rule of reason being applied in a case). 
33. Cavangh, supra note 25, at 458; see also Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 
468 U.S. at 109 (applying "quick look" or "truncated" rule of reason 
analysis, holding elaborate inquiry was unnecessary to ascertain 
competitive merit of restraints). 
34. Mark A. Lemley, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1219 (2008) ("Antitrust law draws a fundamental 
distinction between so-called horizontal and vertical agreements."). 
35. Id. ("Horizontal agreements are contracts or conspiracies among 
competitors--firms at the same level in the distribution chain that we 
would expect to compete against each other in a free market."). 
36. Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 59 n.28 (1977) ("There may 
be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from 
horizontal restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers. 
There is no doubt that restrictions in the latter category would be illegal 
per se. "); see also Lemley, supra note 34, at 1219 ("Horizontal 
agreements are much more likely to be condemned as per se illegal, 
while analogous vertical restraints are evaluated under the rule of 
reason."); Jeffrey M. Knetsch, A Uniform Rule of Reason for Vertical 
and Horizontal Nonprice Restraints, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 448 (1982) 
("[H]orizontal arrangements are- inherently more suspect [than vertical 
agreements]."). 
37. Knetsch, supra note 36, at 444 ("Vertical restraints are restrictions 
imposed upon the transfer of goods, from one level of the production 
chain to another."). 
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Courts differentiate two types of vertical restraints price and 
non-price. 38 Vertical price restraints require distributors to sell certain 
products at a specified price or to establish minimum or maximum 
prices.39 These restraints can promote interbrand competition because 
they induce retailers to invest in intangibles such as exemplary 
customer service.40 The other form of vertical restraint, non-price,41 to 
commonly take the form of exclusive territorial restraints on 
distributors by manufacturers.42 Exclusive territorial restraints permit 
distributors to exercise exclusive control over a geographic locale.43 
Courts analyze price and non-price vertical restraints under the 
rule of reason,44 centrally considering whether the manufacturer has 
38. See Joseph Anthony Capezzuto, The Nonprice is Right: the Price 
Cutter's Bane Business Electronics v. Sharp Electrnnics, 24 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 565, 566 (1989) ("In determining which rule applies, the Court 
has distinguished between vertical price restraints and vertical nonprice 
restraints."). 
39. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (illustrating the 
imposition of vertical maximum price restraints). 
40. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007) 
("A single manufacturer's use of vertical price restraints tends to 
eliminate intrabrand price competition; this in turn encourages retailers 
to invest in tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that 
aid the manufacturer's position as against rival manufacturers. Resale 
price maintenance also has the potential to give consumers more options 
so that they can choose among low-price, low-service brands; high-price, 
high-service brands; and brands that fall in between."). 
41. See generally Knetsch, supra note 36, at 444-46 (explaining the 
differences between vertical price and non price restraints and the 
resulting competitive effects of vertical and horizontal restraints). 
42. Id. at 444-45 ("The most common nonprice restraints are geographic 
market divisions"); see also Carole A. Casey, The Rule of Reason 
Analysis of Dual Distribution Systems: Does It Further the Purposes of 
the Sherman Act?, 29 B.C. L. REV. 431, 435 (1988) ("Agreements among 
competitors to allocate exclusive territories are a common business 
practice frequently challenged under the Sherman Act."). 
43. See Shantau Dutta et. al., Vertical Territorial Restrictions and Public 
Policy: Theories and Industry Evidence, 63 J. OF MKTG. 121 (1999), 
available at http://research3.bus.wisc.edu/file.php/153/ 
Vertical_Territorial_Restrictions.pdf ("Such restrictions, which are 
initiated by a manufacturer, assign distributors to a particular 
geographical area or sales territory with the objective of restricting 
intrabrand competition."). 
44. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890 (holding that the full rule of reason analysis 
applies to all vertical price restraints); see also Graphic Prods. Distribs. 
v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1567 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Where the 
manufacturer retains ownership and the risk of loss, the more flexible 
rule of reason would apply,"); see also Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 
U.S. 36, 59 (1977) ("[W]e conclude that the appropriate decision is to 
return to the rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions."). 
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substantial market share in the interbrand market.45 Courts also look 
to whether "a restriction eliminates intrabrand competition, 
facilitates collusion, excludes competitors or reinforces 
oligopolistic behavior. "46 The analysis also takes into account other 
business justifications.47 Last, when the balancing test weighs in favor 
of decreasing intrabrand at the expense of increasing interbrand 
competition, courts . should consider whether a more pro-competitive 
means could achieve the same objective.48 
Imposing vertical restraints on downstream distributors seeks to 
prevent intrabrand competition.49 By limiting competition against 
itself, the manufacturer will theoretically increase revenue and 
efficiency, thereby making the product more competitive in the 
interbrand market. 50 Increasing competition in the interbrand market 
generally decreases market concentration and evenly distributes 
market power between firms. 
However, the more substantial a firm's share in the interbrand 
market, the more likely it is to have monopoly power in the relevant 
45. See, e.g., Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 39 (discussing market share of 
two corporations); see also Knetsch, supra note 36, at 456 ("Thus, he 
advocated balancing the harms to intrabrand competition against the 
benefits to interbrand competition that result from vertical nonprice 
restrictions."). 
46. Lynn D. Krauss, Antitrust Issues and Pitfalls in Distribution 
Relationships, 72 MICH. B.J. 538, 539 (1993). 
47. See id. ("Courts deciding under the rule of reason analysis, recognize as 
legitimate several business justifications for non-price restraints: 
Encouraging distributors to promote the brand by advertising and other . 
promotional efforts; Eliminating the "free rider" frequently 
accompanying intense intrabrand competition; Encouraging product 
demonstration by full-service dealers; Encouraging dealers to maintain 
service and maintenance departments; and Stimulating interbrand 
competition, even at the cost of reducing intrabrand competition."). 
48. Id. ("However, even when the benefits of increased interbrand 
competition outweigh the detriments of decreased intrabrand 
competition, the courts will consider whether less restrictive means to 
achieve the legitimate objective were available."). 
49. See Cont'l T. V., 433 U.S. at 54 ("Vertical restrictions reduce 
intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular 
product competing for the business of a given group of buyers. Location 
restrictions have this effect because of practical constraints on the 
effective marketing area of retail outlets."). 
50. Id. at 54-56 ("Economists have identified a number of ways in which 
manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more effectively 
against other manufacturers .... Indeed, to the extent that the form of 
the transaction is related to interbrand benefits, the Court's distinction 
is inconsistent with its articulated concern for the ability of smaller 
firms to compete effectively with larger ones."). 
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market.51 This correlation raises substantial antitrust concerns due to 
the harmful effects of monopolies on consumers,52 as opposed to 
growth resulting from superior product, business acumen, or 
historical accident. "53 In addition, if a firm already has control of a 
market, no legitimate business reason may justify the firm's 
imposition of vertical restraints to strengthen its grip on the relevant 
market.54 
Although GTE Sylvania sets forth the legal framework for 
analyzing vertical restraints, lower courts are inconsistent in their 
approaches to this issue.55 For example, in Eiberger v. Sony 
Corporation of America, the Second Circuit applied a more stringent 
approach than called for in GTE Sylvania.56 That same year, the 
51. Knetsch, supra note 36, at 448 ("A manufacturer's degree of market 
power may play an important role in the balancing of intrabrand and 
interbrand competitive effects. The imposition of nonprice restraints by 
a manufacturer with greater market power is more likely to have an 
overall anticompetitive effect, because the harms to intrabrand 
competition will outweigh any benefit to the manufacturer's interbrand 
competitive position. A manufacturer with little market power is not 
able to extract monopoly profits by imposing vertical restraints, and 
therefore has no motive for imposing restraints other than to strengthen 
his competitive position."); see also Krauss, supra note 46, at 539 
("Absent monopoly power, exclusive distribution agreements are 
permissible."). 
52. See generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' fllegal 
Conduct under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 814 (2000) 
("Modern economists emphasize that monopolies misallocate and waste 
economic resources. Since monopolists can price products in excess of the 
level that would prevail in a competitive market, they are able to bring 
about a transfer of wealth from consumers to themselves. Furthermore, 
a 'deadweight loss' occurs in monopoly markets because a monopolist 
has the ability unilaterally to reduce output in order to increase prices. 
Since the monopolist makes no profit on the output it does not produce, 
a portion of the wealth taken away from consumers is not transferred to 
the monopolist, but is simply 'lost."'). 
53. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
54. See Graphic Prods. Distribs. V. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 
1983) (finding Itek could not establish a legitimate, pro-competitive 
purpose for the vertical restraints). 
55. Seth E. Lipner, Restricted Distribution at the FTC: Rule of Reason or 
Reign of Chaos?, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 309, 309 (1984) ("Since 1977, 
the courts have struggled in applying the new standard. The various 
circuits have developed different approaches and guidelines making the 
law far from uniform."). 
56. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980) 
("Unless we are to conclude that an anticompetitive impact on 
intrabrand competition cannot alone support a finding that §1 has been 
violated - and we see no basis for such a conclusion . . . . we must 
conclude that [the plaintiff] has proven such a violation here. The 
district court correctly determined that [the defendant's]1975 warranty 
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substantial market share in the interbrand market.45 Courts also look 
to whether "a restriction eliminates intrabrand competition, 
facilitates collusion, excludes competitors or reinforces 
oligopolistic behavior. "46 The analysis also takes into account other 
business justifications.47 Last, when the balancing test weighs in favor 
of decreasing intrabrand at the expense of increasing interbrand 
competition, courts . should consider whether a more pro-competitive 
means could achieve the same objective.48 
Imposing vertical restraints on downstream distributors seeks to 
prevent intrabrand competition.49 By limiting competition against 
itself, the manufacturer will theoretically increase revenue and 
efficiency, thereby making the product more competitive in the 
interbrand market.50 Increasing competition in the interbrand market 
generally decreases market concentration and evenly distributes 
market power between firms. 
However, the more substantial a firm's share in the interbrand 
market, the more likely it is to have monopoly power in the relevant 
45. See, e.g., Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 39 (discussing market share of 
two corporations); see also Knetsch, supra note 36, at 456 ("Thus, he 
advocated balancing the harms to intrabrand competition against the 
benefits to interbrand competition that result from vertical nonprice 
restrictions."). 
46. Lynn D. Krauss, Antitrust Issues and Pitfalls in Distribution 
Relationships, 72 MICH. B.J. 538, 539 (1993). 
47. See id. ("Courts deciding under the rule of reason analysis, recognize as 
legitimate several business justifications for non-price restraints: 
Encouraging distributors to promote the brand by advertising and other 
promotional efforts; Eliminating the "free rider" frequently 
accompanying intense intrabrand competition; Encouraging product 
demonstration by full-service dealers; Encouraging dealers to maintain 
service and maintenance departments; and Stimulating interbrand 
competition, even at the cost of reducing intrabrand competition."). 
48. Id. ("However, even when the benefits of increased interbrand 
competition outweigh the detriments of decreased intrabrand 
competition, the courts will consider whether less restrictive means to 
achieve the legitimate objective were available."). 
49. See Cont'l T. V., 433 U.S. at 54 ("Vertical restrictions reduce 
intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a particular 
product competing for the business of a given group of buyers. Location 
restrictions have this effect because of practical constraints on the 
effective marketing area of retail outlets."). 
50. Id. at 54-56 ("Economists have identified a number of ways in which 
manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more effectively 
against other manufacturers .... Indeed, to the extent that the form of 
the transaction is related to interbrand benefits, the Court's distinction 
is inconsistent with its articulated concern for the ability of smaller 
firms to compete effectively with larger ones."). 
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market.51 This correlation raises substantial antitrust concerns due to 
the harmful effects of monopolies on consumers,52 as opposed to 
growth resulting from superior product, business acumen, or 
historical accident. "53 In addition, if a firm already has control of a 
market, no legitimate business reason may justify the firm's 
imposition of vertical restraints to strengthen its grip on the relevant 
market.54 
Although GTE Sylvania sets forth the legal framework for 
analyzing vertical restraints, lower courts are inconsistent in their 
approaches to this issue.55 For example, in Eiberger v. Sony 
Corporation of America, the Second Circuit applied a more stringent 
approach than called for in GTE Sylvania.56 That same year, the 
51. Knetsch, supra note 36, at 448 ("A manufacturer's degree of market 
power may play an important role in the balancing of intrabrand and 
interbrand competitive effects. The imposition of nonprice restraints by 
a manufacturer with greater market power is more likely to have an 
overall anticompetitive effect, because the harms to intrabrand 
competition will outweigh any benefit to the manufacturer's interbrand 
competitive position. A manufacturer with little market power is not 
able to extract monopoly profits by imposing vertical restraints, and 
therefore has no motive for imposing restraints other than to strengthen 
his competitive position."); see also Krauss, supra note 46, at 539 
("Absent monopoly power, exclusive distribution agreements are 
permissible."). 
52. See generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' fllegal 
Conduct under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 814 (2000) 
("Modern economists emphasize that monopolies misallocate and waste 
economic resources. Since monopolists can price products in excess of the 
level that would prevail in a competitive market, they are able to bring 
about a transfer of wealth from consumers to themselves. Furthermore, 
a 'deadweight loss' occurs in monopoly markets because a monopolist 
has the ability unilaterally to reduce output in order to increase prices. 
Since the monopolist makes no profit on the output it does not produce, 
a portion of the wealth taken away from consumers is not transferred to 
the monopolist, but is simply 'lost."'). 
53. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
54. See Graphic Prods. Distribs. V. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 
1983) (finding Itek could not establish a legitimate, pro-competitive 
purpose for the vertical restraints). 
55. Seth E. Lipner, Restricted Distribution at the FTC: Rule of Reason or 
Reign of Chaos?, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 309, 309 (1984) ("Since 1977, 
the courts have struggled in applying the new standard. The various 
circuits have developed different approaches and guidelines making the 
law far from uniform."). 
56. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980) 
("Unless we are to conclude that an anticompetitive impact on 
intrabrand competition cannot alone support a finding that §1 has been 
violated - and we see no basis for such a conclusion .... we must 
conclude that [the plaintiff] has proven such a violation here. The 
district court correctly determined that [the defendant's]1975 warranty 
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals shifted to a much more liberal 
analysis of vertical restraints in Borger v. Yamaha International 
Corporation,57 a decision that ultimately diminished intrabrand 
competition.58 This variation in standards for assessing vertical 
restraints needlessly interferes with business· and hinders lawyers' 
ability to counsel their clients effectively.59 The nature of high 
technology markets demands a more consistent, logical approach 
toward analyzing vertical territorial restraints. 
The next section examines the unique nature of high technology 
markets. In particular, Section III provides insight into why high 
technology markets are different from other, more mature markets, 
and illustrates how a large independent retailer subject to a vertical 
territorial restraint can harm consumers of high technology products. 
Ill. THE UNIQUENESS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS AND 
THE NEED FOR SUPERIOR CUSTOMER SERVICE 
The rapid pace of development of high technology products has 
created a special market environment. Section A illustrates this 
uniqueness and the resulting importance that retailers provide 
superior customer service with respect to these products. In the 
context of high technology markets, Section B explores the 
imposition of vertical restraints on big-box retailers, such as Wal-
Mart, and how these restraints create problems in customers' ability 
to receive adequate customer service. 
fee system was an unreasonable restraint of trade, and that it therefore 
violated §1."); see also Lipner, supra note 55, at n.7 ("[The] Second 
Circuit takes a tough approach to vertical restraints in Eiberger v. Sony 
Corp. of Am. . . . . concluding that an anticompetitive impact on 
intraband competition can alone support a finding that § 1 of the 
Sherman Act has been violated."). 
57. See Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1980). 
58. Id. at 397 ("In the instant case, the jury was instructed to find Yamaha 
liable solely on the basis of a purpose to restrict intrabrand competition, 
without any finding of either a purpose or effect related to interbrand 
competition. This was reversible error."). 
59. See Piraino, supra note 22, at 363 ("When the rule of reason supplanted 
the per se rule as the dominant approach in restraint of trade litigation, 
antitrust cases became more complicated and their outcome became 
more difficult to predict. As a result, antitrust enforcement under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act lost much of its deterrent effect. Antitrust 
practitioners were no longer able to advise their clients with certainty of 
the type of conduct that would be permitted or precluded."). 
494 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Recognizing the Importance of Intrabrand 
Competition in High Technology Markets 
A. The Unique Nature of High Technology Markets 
High technology markets are more dynamic and innovate at a 
much faster pace compared to other markets.60 With so much change 
in so little time, consumers need guidance from retailors on their 
purchases. For example, consider the evolution of cell phones. Less 
than thirty years ago, Motorola produced and sold the first hand-held 
cell phone.61 The user was limited to making and receiving calls.62 Less 
than thirty years later, Apple introduced its fifth generation iPhone 
which offers features such as a touch screen, a digital camera, a sixty~ 
four gigabyte hard drive, mobile Internet access, GPS, Bluetooth 
connectivity, and millions of applications. 63 
This evolution of high technology is startling when compared to 
more mature technologies such as automobiles. Automobiles have 
existed for over 150 years,64 yet fundamental features have persisted 
such as steering wheels, transmissions, and pedals. Even autonomou~ 
cars will still have steering wheels and pedals because technology has 
60. See generally Lawrence M. Rausch, Industry, Technology, and the 
Global Marketplace, in NAT'L Ser. BD., Ser. AND ENGINEERING 
INDICATORS, Vol. 1 (2002). ("The global market for high-technology 
goods is growing at a faster rate than that for other manufactured 
goods, and high-technology industries are driving economic growth 
around the world. ?ming the 19-year period examined (1980-98), high-
technology production grew at an inflation-adjusted average annual rate 
of nearly 6.0 percent compared with 2.7 percent for other manufactured 
goods. Global economic activity was especially strong at the end of the 
period (1995-98), when high-technology industry output grew at 13.9 
percent per year, more than three times the rate of growth for all other 
manufacturing industries. Output by the four high-technology 
industries, those identified as being the most research intensive, 
represented 7.6 percent of global production of all manufactured goods 
in 1980; b~ 1998, this figure rose to 12.7 percent.") (citations omitted); 
see also, P1tofsky Statement, supra note 11, (stating "Speed of Market 
Transition" is more frequent in high-technology industries than in other 
more mature industries). 
61. First cell phone a true 'brick', NBCNEWS (Apr. 11, 2005, 6:55 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7432915/ns/technology_and_science-
wireless/t/first-cell-phone-true-brick/#.UQrDb6UTGFI. 
62. Id. 
63. Apple Introduces ifhone 5, APPLE (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library /2012/09/12Apple-Introduces-iPhone-
5.html (boasting "the world's most advanced mobile operating 
system."). 
64. Timeline: History of the Electric Car, PBS (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.pbs .. org(now /shows/223/electric-car-timeline.html ("[In] 
1832-1839 Scottish mventor Robert Anderson invents the first crude 
electric carriage powered by non-rechargeable primary cells."). 
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals shifted to a much more liberal 
analysis of vertical restraints in Borger v. Yamaha International 
Corporation,57 a decision that ultimately diminished intrabrand 
competition.58 This variation in standards for assessing vertical 
restraints needlessly interferes with business· and hinders lawyers' 
ability to counsel their clients effectively.59 The nature of high 
technology markets demands a more consistent, logical approach 
toward analyzing vertical territorial restraints. 
The next section examines the unique nature of high technology 
markets. In particular, Section III provides insight into why high 
technology markets are different from other, more mature markets, 
and illustrates how a large independent retailer subject to a vertical 
territorial restraint can harm consumers of high technology products. 
III. THE UNIQUENESS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS AND 
THE NEED FOR SUPERIOR CUSTOMER SERVICE 
The rapid pace of development of high technology products has 
created a special market environment. Section A illustrates this 
uniqueness and the resulting importance that retailers provide 
superior customer service with respect to these products. In the 
context of high technology markets, Section B explores the 
imposition of vertical restraints on big-box retailers, such as Wal-
Mart, and how these restraints create problems in customers' ability 
to receive adequate customer service. 
fee system was an unreasonable restraint of trade, and that it therefore 
violated §1."); see also Lipner, supra note 55, at n.7 ("[The] Second 
Circuit takes a tough approach to vertical restraints in Eiberger v. Sony 
Corp. of Am. . . . . concluding that an anticompetitive impact on 
intraband competition can alone support a finding that § 1 of the 
Sherman Act has been violated."). 
57. See Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1980). 
58. Id. at 397 ("In the instant case, the jury was instructed to find Yamaha 
liable solely on the basis of a purpose to restrict intrabrand competition, 
without any finding of either a purpose or effect related to interbrand 
competition. This was reversible error."). 
59. See Piraino, supra note 22, at 363 ("When the rule of reason supplanted 
the per se rule as the dominant approach in restraint of trade litigation, 
antitrust cases became more complicated and their outcome became 
more difficult to predict. As a result, antitrust enforcement under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act lost much of its deterrent effect. Antitrust 
practitioners were no longer able to advise their clients with certainty of 
the type of conduct that would be permitted or precluded."). 
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A. The Unique Nature of High Technology Markets 
High technology markets are more dynamic and innovate at a 
much faster pace compared to other markets.60 With so much change 
in so little time, consumers need guidance from retailors on their 
purchases. For example, consider the evolution of cell phones. Less 
than thirty years ago, Motorola produced and sold the first hand-held 
cell phone.61 The user was limited to making and receiving calls.62 Less 
than thirty years later, Apple introduced its fifth generation iPhone 
which offers features such as a touch screen, a digital camera, a sixty~ 
four gigabyte hard drive, mobile Internet access, GPS, Bluetooth 
connectivity, and millions of applications.63 
This evolution of high technology is startling when compared to 
more mature technologies such as automobiles. Automobiles have 
existed for over 150 years,64 yet fundamental features have persisted 
such as steering wheels, transmissions, and pedals. Even autonomou~ 
cars will still have steering wheels and pedals because technology has 
60. See generally Lawrence M. Rausch, Industry, Technology, and the 
Global Marketplace, in NAT'L Ser. BD., Ser. AND ENGINEERING 
INDICATORS, Vol. 1 (2002). ("The global market for high-technology 
goods is growing at a faster rate than that for other manufactured 
goods, and high-technology industries are driving economic growth 
around the world. ~uring the 19-year period examined (1980-98), high-
technology production grew at an inflation-adjusted average annual rate 
of nearly 6.0 percent compared with 2. 7 percent for other manufactured 
goods. Global economic activity was especially strong at the end of the 
period (1995-98), when high-technology industry output grew at 13.9 
percent per year, more than three times the rate of growth for all other 
manufacturing industries. Output by the four high-technology 
industries, those identified as being the most research intensive, 
represented 7.6 percent of global production of all manufactured goods 
in 1980; b~ 1998, this figure rose to 12.7 percent.") (citations omitted); 
see also, P1tofsky Statement, supra note 11, (stating "Speed of Market 
Transition" is more frequent in high-technology industries than in other 
more mature industries). 
61. First cell phone a true 'brick', NBCNEWS (Apr. 11, 2005, 6:55 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7432915/ns/technology_and_science-
wireless/t/first-cell-phone-true-brick/#.UQrDb6UTGFI. 
62. Id. 
63. Apple Introduces ifhone 5, APPLE (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library /2012/09/12Apple-Introduces-iPhone-
5.html (boasting "the world's most advanced mobile operating 
system."). 
64. Timeline: History of the Electric Car, PBS (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.pbs .. org(now/shows/223/electric-car-timeline.html ("[In] 
1832-1839 Scottish mventor Robert Anderson invents the first crude 
electric carriage powered by non-rechargeable primary cells."). 
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not evolved far enough to render them useless. 65 Cars have 
undoubtedly evolved since their inception, but their rate of 
development pales compared to the progress seen in the short period 
that high technology consumer products like computers, cell phones, 
and software have existed. 
The rapid turnover rate of high technology products presents 
another major difference between high technology markets and other 
markets.66 High technology products become obsolete much faster 
than other markets' products.67 For example, smartphone 
manufacturers regularly release new smartphones with new features 
and updated operating systems. 68 On average, Americans keep their 
cell phone for approximately twenty months, while changing cars 
every eleven years. 69 
Because of the accelerating technological advancement in high 
technology products, consumers will continue to need guidance when 
making purchases. Whether it is a television, computer, or cell phone, 
high technology products are changing rapidly, and in many 
instances, their features and interface are becoming more complex for 
the user. Many retailors provide superior customer service, even in the 
absence of intrabrand competition. Nevertheless, large independent 
retailers like Wal-Mart and Target typically lack the level of customer 
65. See Suzanne Ashe, Volkswagen's 'Temporary Auto Pilot' will drive your 
car up to 80 mph, CNET (June 25, 2011, 3:02 pm), 
http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13746_7-20074113-48/volkswagens-
temporary-auto-pilot-will-drive-your-car-up-to-80-mph/ ("No heading to 
the back of the RV to make a sandwich, or crawling into the back seat 
to watch a movie with the kids--just yet."). 
66. See Pitofsky Statement, supra note 11,("New generations of products, 
undermining existing market power, appear more frequently in high-tech 
than in mature industries."). 
67. See id. 
68. Nick Wingfield, Despite a Slowdown, Smartphone Advances Are Still 
Ahead, N.Y.TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012 /09 /17 /technology/ despite-a-slowdown-
smartphone-advances-are-still-ahead.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O 
("Faster chips, bigger screens and speedier wireless Internet connections 
are among the refinements smartphone users can count on year after 
year in new models."). 
69. Average Lerigth of Time Wireless Customers Keep Their Mobile Phones 
Increases Notably, J.D. POWER AND Assoc. (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://businesscenter.jdpower.com/news/pressrelease.aspx?ID=2010185 
("The study finds that customers are keeping their traditional mobile 
devices for an average of 20.5 months . . . . "); Our cars are getting 
older, too: Average age now 10.8 years, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2012, 4:02 
pm), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money /autos/story /2012-01-
17 /cars-trucks-age-polk/52613102/1 ("The average age of the cars and 
trucks on U.S. roads hit a record 10.8 years as of July 1, 2011."). 
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service consumers of high technology products need to make educated 
purchases.70 
B. The Big-Box Problem 
Big-box retailers like Wal-Mart, Target, and K-Mart sell 
electronic high technology products and generally offer relatively low 
prices, which benefit consumers.71 At the same time, large retailers' 
lackluster customer service creates problems for high technology 
markets that might not exist in other markets. 72 The dynamic nature 
of high technology markets and their products73 invites a deeper 
investigation of the relationship between quality of customer service, 
vertical restraints, and competition. 
Manufacturers imposing vertical territorial restraints upon large 
distributors selling the manufacturer's products can detrimentally 
affect intrabrand competition. In this situation, consumers have no 
choice but to purchase a high technology product at a big-box retail 
store. If not for the vertical restraints, consumers might favor of 
smaller retailers with superior customer service over big-box stores. 
Consequently, big-box stores might lose profits to smaller dealers 
carrying the same products or be compelled to implement a more 
effective customer service policy. For example, assume Apple has 
distribution agreements that incorporate vertical territorial 
restrictions with Wal-Mart and Target to sell some of its products.74 
Pursuant to these agreements, no distributor may sell Apple products 
70. See Nick Simeonidis, Buydowns: A Practical Way to Discount Under 
Robinson-Patman, 21 ANTITRUST 36, 36 (2006-2007) ("Big Box 
competes on price. Consumers brave the crowds and tolerate the lack of 
personal service at Big Box in order to get the lowest price."). 
71. See id. 
72. Even low prices can cause intrabrand competition to decrease, resulting 
in lackluster customer service. See Christopher J. Heck, Concerted 
Action and the Preemption of State Fair Trade Provisions after Leegin, 
2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 853, 892-93 ("The American Bar Association, 
in urging Congress not to pass a statute to overturn Leegin, has 
expressed precisely this concern for preserving competition at the retail 
level, stating that '[t ]he per se prohibition on minimum resale price 
maintenance in force for several decades has had the effect of enhancing 
the market power of very large retailers that carry a wide variety of 
products,' enabling them to sell certain products at 'loss leader prices' 
that smaller retailers cannot match, which will result in the 
disappearance of the smaller retailers. Whether all economists will agree 
with such an analysis is an open question, but, ultimately, it may be the 
wrong question."). 
73. See RAUSCH, supra note 60. 
74. Adam Dickter, Wal-Mart Will Sell Apple's iPad, Starting with Online, 
SCI-TECH TODAY (Oct. 12, 2010, 2:27 P.M.), http://www.sci-tech-
today.com/story.xhtml?story_id=031003GMCJKG&full_skip=l. 
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not evolved far enough to render them useless. 65 Cars have 
undoubtedly evolved since their inception, but their rate of 
development pales compared to the progress seen in the short period 
that high technology consumer products like computers, cell phones, 
and software have existed. 
The rapid turnover rate of high technology products presents 
another major difference between high technology markets and other 
markets.66 High technology products become obsolete much faster 
than other markets' products.67 For example, smartphone 
manufacturers regularly release new smartphones with new features 
and updated operating systems.68 On average, Americans keep their 
cell phone for approximately twenty months, while changing cars 
every eleven years. 69 
Because of the accelerating technological advancement in high 
technology products, consumers will continue to need guidance when 
making purchases. Whether it is a television, computer, or cell phone, 
high technology products are changing rapidly, and in many 
instances, their features and interface are becoming more complex for 
the user. Many retailors provide superior customer service, even in the 
absence of intrabrand competition. Nevertheless, large independent 
retailers like Wal-Mart and Target typically lack the level of customer 
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undermining existing market power, appear more frequently in high-tech 
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67. See id. 
68. Nick Wingfield, Despite a Slowdown, Smartphone Advances Are Still 
Ahead, N.Y.TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012) available at 
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are among the refinements smartphone users can count on year after 
year in new models."). 
69. Average Le'(/,gth of Time Wireless Customers Keep Their Mobile Phones 
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http://businesscenter.jdpower.com/news/pressrelease.aspx?ID=2010185 
("The study finds that customers are keeping their traditional mobile 
devices for an average of 20.5 months . . . . "); Our cars are getting 
older, too: Average age now 10.8 years, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2012, 4:02 
pm), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money /autos/story /2012-01-
17 /cars-trucks-age-polk/52613102/1 ("The average age of the cars and 
trucks on U.S. roads hit a record 10.8 years as of July 1, 2011."). 
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service consumers of high technology products need to make educated 
purchases. 70 
B. The Big-Box Problem 
Big-box retailers like Wal-Mart, Target, and K-Mart sell 
electronic high technology products and generally offer relatively low 
prices, which benefit consumers.71 At the same time, large retailers' 
lackluster customer service creates problems for high technology 
markets that might not exist in other markets. 72 The dynamic nature 
of high technology markets and their products73 invites a deeper 
investigation of the relationship between quality of customer service, 
vertical restraints, and competition. 
Manufacturers imposing vertical territorial restraints upon large 
distributors selling the manufacturer's products can detrimentally 
affect intrabrand competition. In this situation, consumers have no 
choice but to purchase a high technology product at a big-box retail 
store. If not for the vertical restraints, consumers might favor of 
smaller retailers with superior customer service over big-box stores. 
Consequently, big-box stores might lose profits to smaller dealers 
carrying the same products or be compelled to implement a more 
effective customer service policy. For example, assume Apple has 
distribution agreements that incorporate vertical territorial 
restrictions with Wal-Mart and Target· to sell some of its products. 74 
Pursuant to these agreements, no distributor may sell Apple products 
70. See Nick Simeonidis, Buydowns: A Practical Way to Discount Under 
Robinson-Patman, 21 ANTITRUST 36, 36 (2006-2007) ("Big Box 
competes on price. Consumers brave the crowds and tolerate the lack of 
personal service at Big Box in order to get the lowest price."). 
71. See id. 
72. Even low prices can cause intrabrand competition to decrease, resulting 
in lackluster customer service. See Christopher J. Heck, Concerted 
Action and the Preemption of State Fair Trade Provisions after Leegin, 
2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 853, 892-93 ("The American Bar Association, 
in urging Congress not to pass a statute to overturn Leegin, has 
expressed precisely this concern for preserving competition at the retail 
level, stating that '[t ]he per se prohibition on minimum resale price 
maintenance in force for several decades has had the effect of enhancing 
the market power of very large retailers that carry a wide variety of 
products,' enabling them to sell certain products at 'loss leader prices' 
that smaller retailers cannot match, which will result in the 
disappearance of the smaller retailers. Whether all economists will agree 
with such an analysis is an open question, but, ultimately, it may be the 
wrong question."). 
73. See RAUSCH, supra note 60. 
74. Adam Dickter, Wal-Mart Will Sell Apple's iPad, Starting with Online, 
SCI-TECH TODAY (Oct. 12, 2010, 2:27 P.M.), http://www.sci-tech-
today.com/story.xhtml?story_id=031003GMCJKG&full_skip=l. 
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within fifty miles of another distributor that sells Apple products. In 
locations where Apple stores exist, adequate customer service is 
probably not an issue. However, in geographic locations where only 
big-box retailers exist, consumers will face inferior customer service 
when purchasing Apple products.75 
Currently, courts do not consider customer service when 
evaluating distributors and fail to apply a uniform analysis to vertical 
restraints. The analysis generally reflects empirical economic data and 
the market share of the manufacturer in the interbrand market.76 But 
in light of the importance of intrabrand competition within a given 
geographic area, courts should also consider the nature of the 
distributors and other market characteristics unique to the geographic 
market. Section IV proposes a standard for courts to consider when 
analyzing vertical territorial restraints under the rule of reason in high 
technology markets. 
IV. PROPOSAL: A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO 
ANALYZING VERTICAL RESTRAINTS WITH RESPECT TO 
lNTRABRAND COMPETITION IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 
Courts applying the rule of reason to a vertical restraint typically 
quote Justice Brandeis from the following passage in Board of Trade 
of City of Chicago v. United States: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such 
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition 
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition. To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which 
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed 
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This 
is not because a good intention will save an otherwise 
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge 
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences. 77 
75. Even though the consumer could purchase the product on the Internet, 
there is typically no customer service for internet purchases. 
76. See generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of 
Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1753, 1761-70 (1994) (explaining the majority of courts analyses 
under the rule of reason). 
77. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918); see also Piraino, supra note 76, at 1761 ("The courts simply 
quote 'a long list of factors without any indication of priority or weight 
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Even though the rule of reason appears frequently in federal 
court, "the analysis has largely been confined to the issue of whether 
a rule of reason or per se standard should apply, "78 and not the 
analysis of the factors contemplated by the Court in Board of Trade 
of City of Chicago. 79 For example, a court that decides the rule of 
reason is · applicable typically remands the case without providing 
guidance for the lower court.80 Without an in-depth and case-specific 
cons1deration of the factors set forth by Justice Brandeis, determining 
if a restraint is pro-competitive or harmful becomes difficult. 
With respect to high technology markets, the need for superior 
customer service is apparent. Nevertheless, the use of vertical 
territoriq,L restraints upon distributors threatens to give big-box stores 
monopolistic power over a geographic market. Justice Brandeis stated 
in Board of Trade of City of Chicago that a court tasked with 
analyzing a restraint of trade under the rule of reason should 
"consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is 
applied. "81 If courts truly hew to Justice Brandeis's approach, they 
must examine the nature of a distributor subject to vertical territorial 
to be accorded each factor . . . . "') (quoting M. Laurence Popofsky & 
David B. Goodwin, The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56 
ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 198 (1987)). 
78. Piraino, supra note 76, at 1760. 
79. Id. at 1761 ("The Courts simply quote 'a long list of factors without any 
indication of priority or weight to be accorded each factor.'"); see, e.g., 
Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) 
(applying rule of reason to termination of price-cutting distributor at 
behest of competing distributor); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 · (1986) (applying rule of reason to 
dentists' concerted refusal to deal with insurers); Nw. Wholesale 
Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 
(1985) (applying rule of reason to group boycott where the defendant 
lacked market power or exclusive access to an element essential to 
competition); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 
(1982) (applying per se rule to maximum price-fixing agreement); 
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980) (applying 
per se rule to horizontal agreement to fix credit terms); Broad. Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979) (applying 
rule of reason to horizontal price-fixing arrangement); Bailey's, Inc. v. 
Windsor Am., Inc., 948 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying rule 
of reason to distributor termination); ES Dev. v. RWM Enters., 939 
F.2d 547, 557 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying per se rule to agreement 
between dealers). 
80. Piraino, supra note 76, at 1760 ("Once the courts have decided that the 
rule.of reason is appropriate, they have usually neglected to explain how 
it should be applied on remand."). 
81. Ed. of Trade of City of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 238. The factor set forth 
by Justice Brandeis "consider[s] the facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied0" hereinafter will be referred to as the 
"peculiarity factor." Id. 
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within fifty miles of another distributor that sells Apple products. In 
locations where Apple stores exist, adequate customer service is 
probably not an issue. However, in geographic locations where only 
big-box retailers exist, consumers will face inferior customer service 
when purchasing Apple products.75 
Currently, courts do not consider customer service when 
evaluating distributors and fail to apply a uniform analysis to vertical 
restraints. The analysis generally reflects empirical economic data and 
the market share of the manufacturer in the interbrand market.76 But 
in light of the importance of intrabrand competition within a given 
geographic area, courts should also consider the nature of the 
distributors and other market characteristics unique to the geographic 
market. Section N proposes a standard for courts to consider when 
analyzing vertical territorial restraints under the rule of reason in high 
technology markets. 
IV. PROPOSAL: A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO 
ANALYZING VERTICAL RESTRAINTS WITH RESPECT TO 
lNTRABRAND COMPETITION IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 
Courts applying the rule of reason to a vertical restraint typically 
quote Justice Brandeis from the following passage in Board of Trade 
of City of Chicago v. United States: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such 
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition 
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy 
competition. To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which 
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed 
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This 
is not because a good intention will save an otherwise 
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge 
of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences. 77 
75. Even though the consumer could purchase the product on the Internet, 
there is typically no customer service for internet purchases. 
76. See generally Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of 
Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1753, 1761-70 (1994) (explaining the majority of courts analyses 
under the rule of reason). 
77. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918); see also Piraino, supra note 76, at 1761 ("The courts simply 
quote 'a long list of factors without any indication of priority or weight 
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a rule of reason or per se standard should apply, "78 and not the 
analysis of the factors contemplated by the Court in Board of Trade 
of City of Chicago. 79 For example, a court that decides the rule of 
reason is · applicable typically remands the case without providing 
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if a restraint is pro-competitive or harmful becomes difficult. 
With respect to high technology markets, the need for superior 
customer service is apparent. Nevertheless, the use of vertical 
territoriq,L restraints upon distributors threatens to give big-box stores 
monopolistic power over a geographic market. Justice Brandeis stated 
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rule of reason to horizontal price-fixing arrangement); Bailey's, Inc. v. 
Windsor Am., Inc., 948 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying rule 
of reason to distributor termination); ES Dev. v. RWM Enters., 939 
F.2d 547, 557 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying per se rule to agreement 
between dealers). 
80. Piraino, supra note 76, at 1760 ("Once the courts have decided that the 
rule. of reason is appropriate, they have usually neglected to explain how 
it should be applied on remand."). 
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which the restraint is applied0" hereinafter will be referred to as the 
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restraint. Further defining the peculiarity factor with respect to 
vertical territorial restraints in high technology markets will allow 
courts to assess the likelihood of consumer harm resulting from a 
particular vertical restraint. 
When presented with a vertical territorial restraint involving a 
big-box store and the sale of high technology products, the court 
should apply a three-prong test. The court should weigh the result of 
each prong against the other prongs and consider the factors Justice 
Brandeis promulgated in Board of Trade of City of Chicago.82 In 
addition, courts should apply the current practice of analyzing and 
weighing the manufacturer's interbrand market share against the 
diminution in intrabrand competition to determine whether a vertical 
territorial restraint results in efficiencies or is anticompetitive. , 
Under the first prong, courts should consider which other 
distributors carry the product(s) within the geographic market. If a 
big-box retailor is the only distributor in a territory, the burden 
should shift to the defendant manufacturer to provide a business 
justification or rebuttal that substantially outweighs the anti-
competitive effects. The more distributors within the geographic 
vicinity of the big-box store, the less likely the vertical territorial 
·restraint will be deemed wholly anti-competitive, because the 
consumers will have greater choice as to where to purchase products.83 
The more choices a consumer has, the more likely a defendant 
manufacturer can satisfy this prong. 
Second, courts should examine the distributor's nature. This 
inquiry can be accomplished by objectively analyzing the number of 
staff working in the electronics section of the store, the staff's level of 
training, and the store's customer service policies. For instance, if the 
distributor is a big-box store, then a more detailed inquiry is 
necessary to determine the customer service component. In contrast, 
an Apple Store providing customers with superior service would 
require relatively little analysis.84 While a store may objectively 
appear to provide good customer service, an objective test by itself 
may be inadequate. Therefore, a subjective test that considers 
consumer sentiment is also necessary. If a store can satisfy both the 
objective and subjective tests, then it will satisfy this prong. 
82. Id. (stating that courts should consider the nature of the rule, the scope 
of the rule, the effects of the rule and the severity of the restraint). 
83. To an extent, however, it also depends on what types of distributors are 
located nearby. 
84. See generally CARMINE GALLO, THE APPLE EXPERJENCE: SECRETS TO 
BUILDING INSANELY GREAT CUSTOMER LOYALTY 3 (2012) ("If your 
employees are not trained, personable, and passionate about your brand, 
you'll have no chance of building a company that delivers an Apple 
quality experience."). 
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The third and final prong examines the complexity of the product 
or products. Experts can provide insight regarding the general 
complexity of devices. If an expert decides that an inherently complex 
product requires superior customer service, the burden will shift to 
the defendant manufacturer to prove otherwise. However, an expert's 
finding that the product requires nothing more than consumer self-
education might justify ending the inquiry. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The high technology market is unique in its breakneck pace of 
innovation.85 In the environment of high technology products, 
consumers need adequate customer service in order to make educated 
purchases. In practice, antitrust law treats interbrand competition as 
a more important consideration than intrabrand competition.86 Yet, 
increasing interbrand market share at the expense of intrabrand 
competition via vertical territorial restraints threatens to harm 
consumers. 
This danger is particularly visible when a vertical territorial 
restraint is imposed on a large independent retailor or a,big-box store 
with deficient customer service. Preventing harm is the current policy 
concern behind the antitrust laws,87 however, courts lack uniformity in 
and guidance on applying the rule of reason to vertical restraint 
situations. there must be a standard when analyzing big-box stores 
that sell high technology products subject to vertical territorial 
restraints. 
The Supreme Court's requirement that courts consider "the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied"88 has gone 
all but unheeded.89 This Comment proposes a three-prong analysis 
giving credence to this "peculiarity factor." The first prong considers 
the characteristics of the geographical locale and the. distributors that 
85. See RAUSCH, supra note 60, at 6-1 to 6-40. 
86. See Rodes, supra note 1, at 966 ("According to the Supreme Court in 
Sylvania, intrabrand competition (the competition that takes place 
between distributors of manufacturing firms' products) is considered to 
be less of an enforcement priority than interbrand competition 
(competition between manufacturers)."). 
87. See Bork, supra note 16, at 7 ("My conclusion, drawn from the evidence 
in the Congressional Record, is that Congress intended the courts to 
implement (that is, to take into account in the decision of cases) only 
that value we would today call consumer welfare. To put it another 
way, the policy the courts were intended to apply is the maximization of 
wealth or consumer want satisfaction."). 
88. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918). 
89. See supra Section IV. 
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restraint. Further defining the peculiarity factor with respect to 
vertical territorial restraints in high technology markets will allow 
courts to assess the likelihood of consumer harm resulting from a 
particular vertical restraint. 
When presented with a vertical territorial restraint involving a 
big-box store and the sale of high technology products, the court 
should apply a three-prong test. The court should weigh the result of 
each prong against the other prongs and consider the factors Justice 
Brandeis promulgated in Board of Trade of City of Chicago.82 In 
addition, courts should apply the current practice of analyzing and 
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diminution in intrabrand competition to determine whether a vertical 
territorial restraint results in efficiencies or is anticompetitive. ~ 
Under the first prong, courts should consider which other 
distributors carry the product(s) within the geographic market. If a 
big-box retailor is the only distributor in a territory, the burden 
should shift to the defendant manufacturer to provide a business 
justification or rebuttal that substantially outweighs the anti-
competitive effects. The more distributors within the geographic 
vicinity of the big-box store, the less likely the vertical territorial 
·restraint will be deemed wholly anti-competitive, because the 
consumers will have greater choice as to where to purchase products.83 
The more choices a consumer has, the more likely a defendant 
manufacturer can satisfy this prong. 
Second, courts should examine the distributor's nature. This 
inquiry can be accomplished by objectively analyzing the number of 
staff working in the electronics section of the store, the staff's level of 
training, and the store's customer service policies. For instance, if the 
distributor is a big-box store, then a more detailed inquiry is 
necessary to determine the customer service component. In contrast, 
an Apple Store providing customers with superior service would 
require relatively little analysis.84 While a store may objectively 
appear to provide good customer service, an objective test by itself 
may be inadequate. Therefore, a subjective test that considers 
consumer sentiment is also necessary. If a store can satisfy both the 
objective and subjective tests, then it will satisfy this prong. 
82. Id. (stating that courts should consider the nature of the rule, the scope 
of the rule, the effects of the rule and the severity of the restraint). 
83. To an extent, however, it also depends on what types of distributors are 
located nearby. 
84. See generally CARMINE GALLO, THE APPLE EXPERIENCE: SECRETS TO 
BUILDING INSANELY GREAT CUSTOMER LOYALTY 3 (2012) ("If your 
employees are not trained, personable, and passionate about your brand, 
you'll have no chance of building a company that delivers an Apple 
quality experience."). 
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The third and final prong examines the complexity of the product 
or products. Experts can provide insight regarding the general 
complexity of devices. If an expert decides that an inherently complex 
product requires superior customer service, the burden will shift to 
the defendant manufacturer to prove otherwise. However, an expert's 
finding that the product requires nothing more than consumer self-
education might justify ending the inquiry. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The high technology market is unique in its breakneck pace of 
innovation.85 In the environment of high technology products, 
consumers need adequate customer service in order to make educated 
purchases. In practice, antitrust law treats interbrand competition as 
a more important consideration than intrabrand competition.86 Yet, 
increasing interbrand market share at the expense of intrabrand 
competition via vertical territorial restraints threatens to harm 
consumers. 
This danger is particularly visible when a vertical territorial 
restraint is imposed on a large independent retailor or a big-box store 
with deficient customer service. Preventing harm is the current policy 
concern behind the antitrust laws,87 however, courts lack uniformity in 
and guidance on applying the rule of reason to vertical restraint 
situations. there must be a standard when analyzing big-box stores 
that sell high technology products subject to vertical territorial 
restraints. 
The Supreme Court's requirement that courts consider "the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied"88 has gone 
all but unheeded. 89 This Comment proposes a three-prong analysis 
giving credence to this "peculiarity factor." The first prong considers 
the characteristics of the geographical locale and the. distributors that 
85. See RAUSCH, supra note 60, at 6-1 to 6-40. 
86. See Rodes, supra note 1, at 966 ("According to the Supreme Court in 
Sylvania, intrabrand competition (the competition that takes place 
between distributors of manufacturing firms' products) is considered to 
be less of an enforcement priority than interbrand competition 
(competition between manufacturers)."). 
87. See Bork, supra note 16, at 7 ("My conclusion, drawn from the evidence 
in the Congressional Record, is that Congress intended the courts to 
implement (that is, to take into account in the decision of cases) only 
that value we would today call consumer welfare. To put it another 
way, the policy the courts were intended to apply is the maximization of 
wealth or consumer want satisfaction."). 
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are located in and around that locale. The second prong inquires into 
the nature of the distributor at issue and utilizes both an objective 
and subjective test to determine the quality of customer service the 
distributor provides to its customers. The third and last prong 
examines the complexity of the high technology products. Products 
that do not require customer service likewise do not require this 
analysis. When this test is used, the court should weigh all three 
prongs together, and then rely on the result to examine other 
reasonably applicable factors set forth in Chicago Board of Trade.90 
This approach will provide courts with a better understanding of the 
effects of vertical restraints on customers. In addition, it will provide 
uniformity, which in turn will make it easier for lawyers to counsel 
their clients. 
90. Ed. of Trade of City of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 238. 
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CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE IN 
THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE:-
ARE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES AGENTS OF 
SUPPRESSION OR REVOLUTION? 
Sana Ahmeda 
The Internet is a wild land with its own games, languages and 
gestures through which we are starting to share common 
feelings 
-Ai Weiwei1 
If you want to liberate a society, just give them the Internet 
-Wael Ghonim2 
INTRODUCTION 
As global access to Internet and communications technology 
(ICT) grows, individuals gather on the Internet to discuss everything 
from the best breakfast cafes to opinions about the latest 
governmental decrees.3 In early 2011, increased access to ICTs 
allowed individuals in Tunisia and Egypt to lift the authoritarian veil 
of the oppressive governments that stifled freedom of expression for 
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